Dr. Eran Lerman

VP, Jerusalem Institute For Strategy and Security; former deputy director for foreign policy and international affairs, National Security Council

  1. As far as we know, what does the agreement with Iran include, and does it reflect Israel’s interests?

“No reliable leaks have come out of Vienna as to the full scope and schedule of the agreement. However, it is safe to say that it envisions a return to the JCPOA as it was – nothing ‘stronger and longer’ (and hence, the despair and resignation of some members of the US team), but also not the ‘less for less’ approach that some Israelis feared. Apparently, implementation would be gradual, with some sanctions – such as the release of seven billion dollars held by South Korea – lifted first, and others awaiting the Iranian return to the enrichment limits.

“There still remain key problems: products of enrichment beyond the JCPOA limits – particularly uranium enriched to a level of 60 percent – would need to be disposed of, but the Russian war with Ukraine may block the most obvious avenue for doing that. In addition, there was the Iranian demand for American constitutionally secured guarantees, which is a fantasy pipedream. If the Iranians are tempted by images of US weakness to hold out for that, this could be a deal breaker.”

 

  1. Latest reports in Israel and abroad claim that Iran is very close to obtaining a nuclear bomb. What are the chances that this agreement will manage to “rollback” Teheran’s nuclear capabilities?

Clearly, any return to enriching uranium to a level below 5%, and the removal of uranium enriched above that level, will constitute a ‘rollback’ of some sorts (if – and this is a big ‘if’ – it is reliably verified). But the respite would be short, and soon the ‘sunset clauses’ would open Iran’s path to the bomb once again. Therefore, the real question is what Israel can do to be truly prepared and use wisely the short time it may gain to ready viable options.”

 

  1. Following a deal, what should Israel’s policy vis-à-vis its signatories be in the future? How will it impact the current government’s relationship with the current Administration in Washington, and the US-Israel alliance strategically?

“Israel will remain an ally of the United States: the present government is clearly interested in avoiding the pitfalls of a partisan identification in the US context. Alongside our Gulf partners, it will work with the Department of Defense to find robust ways to mitigate the consequences of the deal. For instance, there may be some significant acquisitions on the table for Israel, given the spirit of the times (Iran is among Putin’s backers).

Criticism will only become bitter if former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will come back to power, or if the US treats the deal – as some did under Obama Administration – not as a limited, necessary measure, but as a measure ending the perception of Iran as an adversarial player.”

 

  1. When Israel refers to the “military option,” what exactly does it entail, and what is the likelihood that we will reach this scenario?

“It is enough to say that the Israeli Air Force has long been training for long-range missions, that Israel special forces have their own special history, that precision weapons and strikes have proved quite effective and that it is not necessary to destroy all what Iran has built as part of the project – the loss of some key nodes would disable it. Finally, Israel’s intelligence penetration of Iran (e.g. the Iranian Archive exposure) should keep the Iranians awake at night.”