1. As far as we know, what does the agreement with Iran include, and does it reflect Israel’s interests?

“It is important to note that public knowledge of the details of the formulating agreement in Vienna is partial and tentative, and details do matter and may change the overall picture. However, details that have come out indicate an agreement that is substantially weaker than the original JCPOA due to several factors.

• “The ‘Sunset Clause’ and other key dates remain the same as in the JCPOA, resulting in a very short period of validity, with the 2025 termination deadline looming large.
• “The breakout time associated with this agreement is estimated at 4-6 months, a period far too short for effective efforts to thwart breakout. The technical know-how and expertise acquired by Iran over the past 3 years positions it in a far better point for obtaining a military nuclear capability if and when it desires to do so. This includes Iran’s handling of advanced centrifuges that are to be stored rather than destroyed, and the quantity of enriched fissile material it has accumulated, if this material remains in Iran. This is in addition to the problem of continued R&D, which carries over from the JCPOA.
• “It is said that sanctions imposed on leaders of the IRGC are to be removed. These sanctions are related to their role in international terrorism and are separate of the nuclear issue. Since all other issues outside of the nuclear domain, such as the Iranian missile project, its regional conduct and its support of terrorism, are intentionally excluded from this deal – simple logic dictates that the personal sanctions on IRGC leadership remain in place, pending Iran’s willingness to negotiate non-nuclear issues.

“Needless to say, this agreement (to the extent the details are accurate) falls very short of reflecting Israeli interests. The short breakout time and the failure to impose measures that would rollback Iranian advances since 2019 leaves Israel and the entire world with a strong possibility of an Iranian breakout scenario.

“Having said that, the agreement will bring the Iranian advancement to a short and temporary freeze of its advancement in the nuclear realm, buying Israel some time – but also giving Iran breathing room due to sanction relief. When this deal is considered in light of the alternative of a continued Iranian race towards military nuclear capabilities, as has been the case since the demise of the JCPOA (Iran is currently reported to possess 33 kilograms of enriched Uranium to a level of 60%) – it may be deemed a better alternative, as a temporary and partial measure.

“Finally, the Russian demands, that have just surfaced due to the war in Ukraine, to exclude Iran from sanction imposed on Russia by the West – might serve to delay the signing of the new nuclear agreement, to Iran’s reported displeasure.”

2. Latest reports in Israel and abroad claim that Iran is very close to obtaining a nuclear bomb. What are the chances that this agreement will manage to “rollback” Teheran’s nuclear capabilities?

“The deal in question was never meant to rollback Iranian nuclear capabilities and will not therefore result in any such rollback. Since the advanced centrifuges that were installed by Iran are said to be stored (ostensibly under IAEA seals) rather than destroyed, Iran will be able to pick up where it stopped immediately, though not in a clandestine manner.

“The storage location is unknown yet, and this is crucial. At one point, storage in Russia was discussed, but with the current state of affairs – this option is questionable. If the advanced centrifuges are stored within Iran, it clearly facilitates access, and they might even be stored within one of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

“The same concern applies to the enriched Uranium Iran has accumulated since the breakdown of the JCPOA – If Iran is permitted to retain it. It must be noted that the know-how and expertise accumulated over the past years cannot be rolled-back either. All this results in zero rollback of the program, and at best, freezing it in place temporarily.

“It is important to note that this failure to rollback the Iranian nuclear program has an effect not only on Israeli interests, but on those of many other players in the Middle East, who might be further incentivized to pursue their own independent nuclear capabilities, to counter the Iranian threat.”

3. Following a deal, what should Israel’s policy vis-à-vis its signatories be in the future? How will it impact the current government’s relationship with the current Administration in Washington, and the US-Israel alliance strategically?

“The current Israeli government seems to hold a strong understanding that the US-Israeli relationship must not become the first casualty of the Iranian nuclear program, and that the agreement is a ‘fait accompli.’ As a result, we can expect a strong Israeli stance against a flawed agreement, and policies pursuing Israeli interests on the matter that are not necessarily compatible with those of the US – but no open conflict or rupture in the overall relations or in the working levels.

“In addition, ostensibly, the current deal should constitute a first step for the Western signatories to pursue what the Biden administration named as a ‘longer and stronger agreement.’ If this is indeed the case, Israel must focus its efforts on shaping this next agreement and ensuring that its interests are reflected in it.”

4. When Israel refers to the “military option”, what exactly does it entail, and what is the likelihood that we will reach this scenario?

“Israel has always kept a military option on the table and has clearly stated that it will take any actions it deems necessary to defend its interests on this matter of preventing an Iranian military nuclear capability from materializing. The question is, ‘Does the United States remain committed to its promises to keep the threat of military option on the table?’”