1. 1. 1. As far as we know, what does the agreement with Iran include, and does it reflect Israel’s interests?

“What we know now, first of all, is that there will probably be a return to what was in the former agreement. This is regarding everything that has to do with the amount of enriched uranium that the Iranians can hold – only 300 kilograms – and the level of approved enrichment – 3.67 percent. All those things were in the previous agreement and there’s no doubt they will need to go back to them. Another thing is, of course, the termination date of the agreement. And there are other things which are included in the agreement, such as when Iran will be allowed to operate advanced centrifuges, how many of them, and so on.

“But we must say that there are two things Iran did in the past 2-3 years, since Trump backed out of the agreement – It waited a year, so it’s basically the last two years – and those are things that the knowledge learned from them can’t be erased. One of them is enrichment to high levels: Iran is enriching uranium to 20% and 60%, according to the IAEA’s last report that was leaked a few days ago; it has 33 kilograms of uranium enriched to a level of 60%, which is two thirds of the amount of fissile material required for a first bomb. It also has 185 kilograms of uranium enriched to a level of 20%, and overall, it has more than three tons of enriched uranium. All of this needs to return to the approximate size of 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to a level of 3.67%.

“Regarding the advanced centrifuges, we know that Iran installed and operated many of those – and it knows how to operate them. The issue of those centrifuges was on the table for a period, but it seems that the US gave up the demand to destroy them and accepted the idea to store them under the inspection of the IAEA. This means that Iran will not use those centrifuges for enrichment, but if a crisis erupts, in which one of the sides backs away from the agreement, whether it’s Iran or the US, Tehran would be able to take all those centrifuges from that warehouse and reinstall them.

“Another issue is related to the sanctions – the Biden Administration said from the beginning that it will lift all of the sanctions that were removed when the JCPOA was agreed in 2015. Iran demanded relief from all of the sanctions imposed by Trump, including those related to terror and human rights, that were reinstated following Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement. From what is leaking out of the talks, it seems that the American administration agreed to lift sanctions related to other fields, not only those that have implications on Iran’s ability to gain economic benefits from the agreement. For instance, if the agreement allows Iran to trade, sell and transfer money into the country, then the sanctions that Trump announced against the Central Bank because of its relations to terror, and not due to nuclear issues – the administration will have to cancel.

“What we understand is that the Iranians demanded to lift all the sanctions Trump imposed, no matter under which pretext, like those against the IRGC – to remove them from the blacklist of terror organizations – or [to remove] people close to Khamenei that were targeted under the pretext of human rights violations [from the blacklist]. The Iranians demanded to lift all of those [sanctions], to go back to the former situation. They argued with the Americans, and this lasted a bit, but I find it hard to believe that the Americans will insist on everything at the end of the day. Maybe they will leave something symbolic, but I think the Iranians will get most of the things the Iranians wanted regarding this issue.

“That’s what we know for now. Each side understands this is the final leg of negotiations, so it tries to force the other side to make decisions and finish the negotiations. But we will see what will happen in the final days, when the discussions will be over.

“Apparently Iran gave up a bit on another point: Lately, Tehran demanded that the IAEA must close all ‘open cases’ investigating Iran over the past two years and [the Iranians] were also condemned in an IAEA resolution. This includes several sites over whose existence Iran didn’t notify the agency, and were found in the archives the Israeli Mossad discovered. The IAEA independently verified the issue, and found remnants of natural uranium, which was not enriched. And it’s obvious the Iranians dealt with this at the site. Now the IAEA is demanding answers from the Iranians about this material’s origin and purpose. So far, the agency didn’t receive answers about four sites. Tehran answered about one site, but this response was deemed unacceptable by the agency, and now that the Board of Governors is set to convene, it is clear that if there isn’t a settlement with Iran – it will be denounced.

“Now, everyone wants to finish with these negotiations, so the Iranians gave up and said this won’t be a binding condition, while the other side has given up and the IAEA chief travelled to Tehran. They reached a compromise there, over which the Iranians will submit a written response until March 20th, the IAEA will reply with questions, and they will debate over each of the sites – and in June the IAEA chief will report to the Board of Governors. This compromise postpones [resolution of] this issue again, but it allows Iran a respectable escape route that won’t prevent the pending agreement.”

2. Latest reports in Israel and abroad claim that Iran is very close to obtaining a nuclear bomb. What are the chances that this agreement will manage to “rollback” Teheran’s nuclear capabilities?

“Iran ‘rollbacks’ [are relevant] over two issues – Regarding the amount of enriched uranium it can hold, 300 kilograms, and the low level to which it is allowed to enrich. These two things won’t allow it to acquire a bomb. In order to make a bomb Iran needs a larger quantity of the fissile material, and to enrich it to a level of 90%. Iran won’t be allowed to do those two things until the agreement terminates.

“Of course, what we had in the past – a year from a decision to breakthrough until they have enough fissile material for one nuclear device – will be shortened now. Many things Iran didn’t know to do before, and it has the know-how now. It knows how to operate advanced centrifuges, for instance. But all of those things are a breach of the agreement, and if Iran will not back away from the agreement until it terminates – which is 15 years, until 2030 [from the original agreement in 2015] – it will not be allowed to enrich uranium to a weapons-grade level and will not be allowed to increase the amount of enriched uranium it possesses in the country. If Iran will meet the agreement’s demands, and one should assume it will, as it has no reason not to, since it doesn’t have a deadline for a bomb, and nothing threatens Tehran’s security in the near future – then this is not a problem.

“Of course, everything Iran learned so far will stay in its scientists’ heads, and add to that the fact that in 2.5-3 years it will be allowed to operate advanced centrifuges in small numbers. But this will be something it already knows how to do, and will only be within the limits of the agreement. This is the price we pay for what happened so far [US withdrawal from the agreement].”

3. Following a deal, what should Israel’s policy vis-à-vis its signatories be in the future? How will it impact the current government’s relationship with the current Administration in Washington, and the US-Israel alliance strategically?

“Politically, Israel should – and I think everyone understands – engage in a direct quiet dialogue with the US like what was done now, before the agreement is signed. I hope that here and there Israel managed to influence the outcome of the agreement. I think it’s necessary – even more now – to continue an intimate, quiet and an unpublicized dialogue with the US about the ‘day after the agreement,’ in which we decide what to do if we receive new information, to discuss strengthening Israel’s military capabilities during the agreement, Israel’s unlimited access [ability] to stop weapons smuggling in Syria to Hezbollah and so on. There’s a list of topics in which Israel’s interest is to talk with the US, and to ensure we have a mutual understanding.

“I think there’s a clear and unequivocal understanding in the US to the Israeli concerns, and no one thinks Israel is exaggerating the Iranian threat. The thing is, that in the current situation, the option of walking without an agreement is considered worse, first by the Americans, but I consider this to be true as well for Israel – when you compare it to the agreement even in the current configuration. Without an agreement, Tehran can decide in a period of weeks, maybe months, to breakthrough to nuclear capability. I don’t think that the US wants to be in such a situation, which forces it to make hard decisions it doesn’t want to deal with. Therefore, for the Americans, there’s no doubt it’s better to have a bad agreement, and they do understand they made significant concessions to the Iranians.

“As for Israel, I hear all the voices crying ‘this agreement is a catastrophe’ – so I want to say what’s on my mind: I think that the withdrawal from the agreement was a strategic mistake and disaster, and what Iran learned in the years following it was very bad. Israel should have used those years to do many things and to better prepare, and it could have thought about the possibility that Iran might change if there’s a financial improvement and foreign companies will enter the local market. But this is already in the past and doesn’t mean anything now. I also think that when you look at the current bad situation, this agreement – which isn’t a good agreement – is better than no agreement at all.”

4. When Israel refers to the “military option”, what exactly does it entail, and what is the likelihood that we will reach this scenario?

“If we won’t be surprised, this agreement will soon be signed. This means Israel should learn to live with an agreement, and will have to use the years it gives Jerusalem – and as I said, it doesn’t allow Iran to breakthrough to a bomb for several years, unless Tehran breaches the agreement.

“This also means that Israeli options might be limited. One must think that Israel would need to think twice before it conducts any preventative activity in Iran and against the Nuclear Program. I guess there will be further considerations that didn’t exist before the agreement.

“On the one hand, Iran will be stepping backwards, but on the other hand, Iran will receive all its funds that had been frozen in international banks, and it will be allowed to export gas and oil – and we all hear about the rise of the price of oil. Tehran will gain many financial benefits, no doubt. Will it be felt at the level of the average person? I doubt it. In the past the Iranians hadn’t managed to translate the benefits into immediate results. Yet, their macro-financial situation will get better, the reserves will increase, and so will their ability to help their proxies in the Middle East – Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Iraqi militias, and so on.

“This money will help the Iranian economy, but I doubt if it will improve the situation of the average Iranian. But no doubt it will allow Tehran to assist all its proxies in the region – in Lebanon, in Yemen , in Iraq and in Gaza. It will as well increase Iran’s feeling of immunity against any military action, and encourage more intervention in the region that will cause more instability in the Middle East.”